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Abstract  
This paper examines the effect of shifts in the relative supply and demand of skills on 
the skill premiums and wage inequality in the British labour market 1972-2002. We 
test the Katz and Murphy (1992) hypothesis that the changes of skill premiums can be 
explained by their relative supply shifts, given stable or steadily growing relative 
demand. Alternatively, Machin (2001) hypothesis holds if the changes of skill 
premiums can be explained by relative demand shifts, given stable or steadily growing 
relative supply. From co-variation of relative skill wages and relative labour supplies 
of skills, we reject the hypothesis that the relative labour demand for skill is stable 
over time for either males or females. By using detrended relative skill wages and 
supplies, we infer that the acceleration of relative demand for skills caused a positive 
association between relative skill wages and labour supplies for males in the 1980s 
and the 2000s, and for females after the 1970s. Hence, the steadily growing relative 
demand in Katz and Murphy (1992) can only broadly fit with the cyclical co-variation 
of skill premiums and supply for males, but not for the long term increasing trend of 
skill premiums and supply of females. We find the acceleration of relative demand for 
skilled workers after the 1970s as suggested in Machin (2001) hypothesis.  
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1. Introduction 
Wage inequality has increased substantially in the United Kingdom and arrived at a 
high level in terms of the UK’s historical experience in the early years of the new 
century (Lindley and Machin, 2011). Rising wage differentials between education 
groups, i.e. skill premiums have been identified as a key feature of rising wage 
inequality (Acemoglu and Autor, 2010). Peng and Kang (2013a) also argue that two 
prominent changes in the British labour market contribute to the rising wage 
inequality: the increase in education/experience attainment inequality has made total 
employment more heterogeneous (endowment effect); skill premiums (mainly 
education and experience premiums) have been increasing over the entire period, 
especially after the 1970s (relative wage effect). This paper aims to investigate 
whether a simple supply and demand framework can fit with these changes in the 
wage structure of the British labour market over the thirty-year period of 1972-2002.  
We use two strands of research to explain wage structure changes. The first 
one is from the work of Katz and Murphy (1992), which examines a negative 
association between relative skill supply and skill premium using the Current 
Population Surveys (CPS) 1964-1988. They argue that fluctuations in the growth rate 
of relative supply for skill, combined with steadily growing relative demand can 
explain changes of the skill premiums. Katz and Murphy’s hypothesis is plotted in 
Figure 1. The horizontal axis represents the relative employment of skilled workers to 
unskilled workers (LS/LU), and the vertical axis represents the relative wage of skilled 
workers to unskilled workers (WS/WU). The relative demand (D1) intersecting relative 
supply (S1) give the original equilibrium point A, in which skilled workers have 
relative wage w1 and relative employment l1. Since the relative demand is constant or 
steadily growing, the relative demand curve would stay at D1 or increase from D1 to 
D2. At the same time, relative supply S1 increases to S2. The new equilibrium has a 
lower relative wage w2 or w3 (that is, lower inequality) and higher relative 
employment l2 or l3 for skilled workers. Over the period of decreasing wage inequality, 
relative supply for skill has overwhelmed the relative demand of skill and showed a 
negative association between changes of relative wages and the changes of relative 
supplies.  
 
(Figure 1 is around here) 
 
On the other hand, many economists find that the changes in the British wage 
inequality are driven primarily by shifts in the relative labour demand favouring more 
skilled workers over less skilled workers (Nickell and Bell, 1995; Nickell and Bell, 
1996; Machin, 2001; O'Mahony et al., 2008; O'Mahony and Peng, 2008). In a relative 
supply and demand framework, a simultaneously rising skill premiums and 
employment share of skilled workers can only suggest that relative demand must have 
risen at a faster rate than supply. Figure 2 describes the supply-demand changes 
behind this argument. Machin (2001) argues that skill-biased technology changes 
(SBTC) increase the relative demand for skilled workers, hence the relative demand 
curve for skilled workers would increase from D1 to D2. At the same time, the relative 
supply of skilled workers stays at S1 or steadily increases from S1 to S2. Hence, the 
new equilibrium has a higher relative wage w2 or w3 (that is, higher inequality) and 
higher relative employment l2 or l3 for skilled workers. Over the period of rising wage 
inequality, relative demand for skill has won the race against the increasing relative 
supply of skill. There is a positive association between relative skill wage and relative 
supply of skill.  
 (Figure 2 is around here) 
 
Therefore, Katz and Murphy (1992) argue that supply fluctuations dominate 
the relative wage changes in the USA during 1964-1988 by proving the negative 
association between relative wage and supply. Machin (2001) illustrates the positive 
associations and concludes that relative demand has surpassed relative supply in both 
the UK and the US during 1980-2000. The interaction between relative supply and 
demand decides relative wages. The positive or negative associations between relative 
supply and relative wage are just outcomes of a horse-race between relative supply 
and demand for skills. In this paper, we test whether this supply-demand framework 
can fit the wage structure changes in the British labour market over the last thirty 
years.  
Even though the changes of skill supply can be due to exogenous institutions 
such as education policy, we do not know why the relative demand changes in the 
ways as described in Katz and Murphy hypothesis or Machin hypothesis. Many 
authors have analyzed the causal factors underpinning the relative demand shifts 
based on concepts of SBTC (Machin and Van Reenen (1998) for seven OECD 
countries and O’Mahony et al. (2008) for four countries), international trade (Wood, 
1994; 1995; 1998) and labour market institutions (Addison et al., 2003; Card et al., 
2004; Peng and Kang, 2013b). In this paper, we here assume that the shocks from 
technology, trade patterns and institutions have been completely absorbed by the 
relative supply-demand changes. Hence, there is no unemployment above the natural 
level in this framework as described in Figure 1 and 2. Holding the full employment 
assumption, the observed relative wage and employment must be “always at the 
equilibrium” and the changes of relative wages can be explained by the interaction 
between the relative supply and demand. The remainder of this paper is organised as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the simple model of supply and demand in Katz and 
Murphy (1992). Section 3 describes the main data sources and measurement of 
relative wage and relative labour supply. In Section 4, we provide the basic empirical 
results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. A model of supply and demand  
In this paper, we treat the different demographic (gender-education-experience) 
groups as distinct labour inputs, and hence imperfect substitutes for each other in the 
production process. Following Katz and Murphy (1992) model, there is an aggregate 
production function, which provides K types of outputs and requires J types of labour 
inputs (J=96 here, that is, 2×6×8 by two gender, six education and eight experience 
groups). It is assumed that there are K sectors in the aggregate production function 
and each sector can only provide one kind of output k but may employ all J types of 
labour. Each sector applies a different technology to combine labour inputs. Thus, the 
production function of sector k can be written as:     
 
)ktkttkt (XFAY                             (1) 
 
where Ykt is the output of sector k in year t; At is the total factor productivity (TFP) 
decided by the neutral technology, that is, an index of the productivity level of the 
whole economy in year t; Xkt is a J×1 vector of labour inputs employed in the sector k 
in year t; Fkt(Xkt) is the contribution from the labour inputs, which is concave for each 
input and decided by non-neutral technology. Hence, the aggregate production 
function is: )ttt F(XAY  , where Yt is a K×1 vector of all kinds of outputs in year t; Xt is 
a J×1 vector of total labour inputs employed and F(Xt) is also concave for each 
aggregate labour input.  
Under the free entry assumption, wages are set equal to the marginal products 
of labour inputs: )tXtt (XFAW  . Then, the labour demand for one kind of labour input is 
the sum of labour demand for this labour input in all sectors, that is, 
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Xt is the labour demand associated with the aggregate production function. In this 
demand function, Wt/At is a J×1 vector of relative wage to the total productivity in 
year t. In addition, Zt is Z×1 vector of labour demand shifts induced by changes of 
technology, international competition and institutions. Under the assumption of a 
concave production function Fkt(Xkt), the relationship between the wage changes and 
labour supply is negative in each sector, given constant labour demand (Zt-Zt-1=0). 
According to Walras’ Law of markets, if all output markets are in equilibrium, the 
market for labor will also be in equilibrium. Hence, there is a negative relationship 
between relative wage (to the contemporary TFP) and labour supply.
1
  
Moreover, even if the demand in equation (2) shifts over the time (Zt-Zt-1≠0), 
the (J×J) matrix of cross relative wage effects on labour demands (i.e.
AWD / ), is still 
negative semi-definite from the concave aggregate production function. Thus, the 
change of labour demand can be written in terms of differentials as: 
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 Katz and Murphy (1992) rearrange equation (3) and multiply the two sides 
by the (1×J) vector of relative wage changes, i.e. )'/( tt AWd . The negative 
semi-definiteness of AWD /  implies that 
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Thus, changes in labour supplies (dXt) net of demand shifts )( tZ dZD  are 
negatively associated with changes in relative wage. It shows the negative relationship 
between changes of net labour supply and relative wages. The discrete version of 
equation (4) is in the form of: 
 
                                                 
1
 That is, 0)()'//( 111   tttttt XXAWAW . If the TFP does not change in a short term, i.e. At=At-1, this 
inequality can be simplified as (Wt-Wt-1)’ (Xt-Xt-1) ≤ 0. This is the common sense of the supply-demand 
theory: as the labour supplies increase, the prices of labour inputs decrease, ceteris paribus. 
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The changes of net supplies are the actual changes of labour supply less the demand 
changes that would have happened at fixed wage (Wt-1/At-1). Thus, there is a negative 
association between relative wage changes and net labour supply changes, as 
described in Figure 1. 
Katz and Murphy (1992) firstly assume the relative demand is stable, so there 
is no change in relative demand over time. Hence, their hypothesis is simplified as
0)()'//( 111   tttttt XXAWAW . Secondly, technological and institutional changes may be 
reflected at last as a steadily growing relative demand for skill. The steady growth of 
relative demand affects equation (5) in two ways: a growth in relative wage and a 
decrease in net labour supply. Hence, equation (5) can be transformed as:
0)()'//( 21111   bXXbAWAW tttttt , in which b1 and b2 are the slope vectors of time trends 
of relative wage and relative demand so that residual vectors ofε1 andε2 only 
capture effects from supply side: Wt/At=a0+b1t+ε1; Dt=a1+b2t+ε2. If the inner 
products of the detrended relative wage changes with the detrended net supplies 
changes were negative, the steadily growing demand hypothesis described in Figure 1 
would be proved.  
However, Acemoglu (2003) argues that even if the returns to scale are 
constant at the firm level, the aggregate production possibilities set of the economy 
may exhibit increasing returns to scale because technologies are also determined 
endogenously. Hence, the production Fkt(Xkt) in equation (1) could be convex for 
skilled labour inputs because of skill-biased technical changes. It suggests that as 
more skilled workers join one sector, the marginal productivity of skilled workers 
may be even higher. The (J×J) matrix of cross relative wage effects on labour 
demands in equation (4) may be positive semi-definite from the convex aggregation 
production.  
Moreover, the wage setting institutions are assumed to be flexible to allow 
relative wage to change in Katz and Murphy (1992). Acemoglu et al. (2001) show that 
trade union could not only push unskilled workers’ wages above the equilibrium 
(hence surplus for unskilled workers), but also depress the wages of skilled workers 
(hence shortage for skilled workers). It suggests that under a rigid labour market with 
strong trade union, relative wages for skilled workers cannot respond to market 
condition. The equation (5) could behave as a negative inequality only because strong 
union depressed the skill premiums below the equilibrium even without increase in 
relative supply of skill. Trade union density in the UK has been declining from the 
peak value around 60% in the 1970s to about 20% in the 2000s (Peng and Kang, 
2013b). The declining trade union allows a more flexible wages for both unskilled and 
skilled workers. However, without intervention from trade union, the unskilled 
workers more possibly have downwards wage flexibility as well as upwards flexibility 
for skilled workers’ wages. It would reflect as an increasing skill premium even with 
increasing relative supply of skills. Machin (2001) argued that SBTC and institutional 
changes (such as trade union decline) were reflected in an accelerating relative 
demand for skill in the 1980s, so that the relative skill supply and skill premium 
increased together. Thus, in the face of SBTC and decline of trade union, the positive 
association between relative wages and relative supply, i.e. 0)()'//( 111   tttttt XXAWAW  
or 0)()'//( 21111   bXXbAWAW tttttt , suggested in the Machin (2001) hypothesis is 
observed.  
 
3. Data description and measurement   
3.1 Measurement of relative wage and relative supply    
The data used in this paper is the series of the annual General Household Survey 
(GHS) for the period from 1972 to 2002. The GHS is a continuous, multipurpose 
survey of large random samples of households across Great Britain, conducted on an 
annual basis by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The survey has been carried 
out continuously except for two breaks: (i) in 1997 when the survey was reviewed and 
(ii) in 1999 when the survey was redeveloped. Hence, we include 29 years of data in 
this paper (T=29) over the period 1972–2002. 
We categorize the data of each year into 96 (2×6×8) distinct labour cells, 
distinguished by two gender, six highest education attainment and eight potential 
labour market experience groups (from one to forty by five years). The six education 
groups include: no any educational or vocational qualification, NOQUAL; with below 
O-level qualifications, BOLEV; with O-level equivalent qualifications, OLEV; with 
A-level equivalent qualifications, ALEV; with higher educational qualifications but 
without degrees, HIGHER; and degree equivalent or above qualifications, DEGREE. 
The experience variable is defined in the standard way as the minimum of (age-years 
of education-5, age-16) as in Katz and Murphy (1992). The 96 labour cells are 
regarded as distinct and imperfectly substitutable labour supplies in the 
supply-demand model. 
Following the same line of Katz and Murphy (1992), two samples are created 
from the GHS data: (1) the count sample: this is a sample taken from the original 
GHS dataset so that we can measure the amount of labour supplied within each 
demographic cell. The count sample is a very close concept to total work force, 
including all individuals who work at least one week in the sample year with clear 
information of weekly working hours (workhrs), regardless of whether they were part- 
or full-time, self-employed, or otherwise. We use annual working hours (weekly 
working hours times annual working weeks) as measure of labour supply. According 
to the ONS (2006), this variable is the most continuous hours variable in the GHS, 
which reflects “Usual number of hours worked per week excluding mealtime and 
overtime”. Furthermore, the total working hours within each demographic cell are 
calculated for each sample year. Then, the total working hours of each cell is divided 
by the sum of all cells in that year so that they are expressed as proportions. Thus, the 
labour supply concept used in this paper is actually a proportion to the total working 
hours, actually a relative labour supply.
2
  
 
 
Since the working hour variable does not include over time hours before 1996, 
the main concern about our labour supply variable is overtime hours which is an 
important part of working hours in the British labor market (Bell et al., 2000). Hence, 
the missing overtime problem in annual working hours may bring biases in our labour 
supply variable. Bell and Hart (2003a; b) show that overtime hours and pay are not 
wholly geared to meeting short-term shifts in production requirements even in labour 
markets like Britain where statutory overtime rules do not apply. The maximum 
                                                 
2
 We have also tested the head count employment measure and found there is not much difference 
from our basic conclusions. The head count employment is an inferior measure of labour input to 
working hours. Hence, we only present results using working hours in this paper. The interested reader 
can contact with authors for results using head count employment. 
lengths of standard weekly hours set by many firms follow wider industrial or 
regional or national collective bargaining norms. Their observations are consistent 
with the view that the conditions for overtime working follow “custom and practice” 
and a long-term contractual role for overtime, suggesting that the proportions of 
overtime in our labour input measure of annual working hours should be stable. 
Hence, the missing overtime problem in our working hours variable may be not very 
serious.  
 (2)The wage sample: the wage sample only includes all full-time employees
 
aged sixteen to sixty-six.
 “Full time employee” here is defined as workers with weekly 
working hours exceeding 35 hours (excluding employer and self-employed). 
Self-employed workers, part time workers and those working without pay are 
excluded from the sample. The wage variable used in this paper is the real gross 
hourly earnings deflated by the annual Retail Price Index (RPI) based on the year of 
1995. Wage variable is calculated only from the wage sample since it can provide 
accurate wage information by excluding noise from extreme cases. In GHS 1972, the 
count sample is broader than the wage sample by about 33 percent. The coverage 
difference between the two samples increases to 61 percent in the GHS 1995, which is 
consistent with the widely agreed fact of more labour participation of women as 
part-time workers after the 1970s. Even though the wage sample is much narrower 
than count sample, we still have enough observations in each cell.    
Empirically, we measure variables in equation (5) using the above two 
samples. First of all, we calculate the working hours shares of 96 demographic cells 
for each sample year from the count sample. The average working hours share of each 
cell over the entire period 1972-2002 is the fixed weight for that cell, i.e. E  (see 
Table A1 in Appendix). For example, male workers without any education 
qualification, but with experience less than 5 years provided about 3.19 percent of the 
total labour input in 1972. The proportion declined to only about 0.23 percent in 2002. 
Hence, the fixed weight of this cell (male-NOQUAL-5) is the average working hours 
share over the entire period: about 1.27 percent. On the other hand, male workers with 
more than 35 years of experience in the DEGREE group provided about 0.15 percent 
of the total labour input in 1972. The proportion increased to about 0.64 percent in 
2002. Hence, the fixed weight of this cell (male-DEGREE-40) is the average working 
hours share over the entire period: about 0.44 percent. 
Second, we calculate the mean hourly wage of each cell for each sample year. 
Hence, Wt in equation (5) is a 96 ×1 vector, which denotes the mean wages for our 96 
demographic (gender-education-experience) cells in year t (t=1972…2002). Using the 
average working hours shares ( E ), the fixed weighted mean wage of that year is 
calculated, that is the wage index of that year (At, see the upper part of Table A2 in 
Appendix). The fixed weighted mean wage was about 5.22 pounds (based on 1995 
pounds) per hour in 1972, and then increased to about 7.07 pounds per hour in 2002. 
Thus, after controlling for the labour input composition shifts, the productivity level 
in the UK has increased about 35.4 percent, i.e. (7.07-5.22)/5.22 over the entire 
period.  
Consequently, the mean wage of each cell is divided by the wage index of that 
year to get the relative wage of the cell (Wjt/At, see the lower part of Table A2 in 
Appendix). The average relative wage of each cell over the entire period 1972-2002 is 
the efficiency units of this worker group. For instance, the mean wage of the 
male-NOQUAL-5 group was about 55 percent of the wage index in 1972. In 2002, the 
relative wage of this group was about 58 percent. The average relative wage over the 
last thirty years is about 0.55. On the other hand, the mean wage of the 
male-DEGREE-40 group was about 2.54 times of the wage index in 1972 and 1.77 
times in 2002. Hence, the efficiency units of this group are about 1.91, which suggest 
an average skill premium of 91% for this group. 
Last but not least, the relative labour supply used in this paper is the working 
hours’ share of each cell measured in efficiency units. The working hours share of 
each cell multiplies its efficiency units, and divided by the sum of all cells (see Table 
A3 in Appendix). Hence, the relative supply is quite different from the simple 
working hours share, especially for low skilled and high skilled workers. For example, 
the working hours’ share of the male-NOQUAL-5 group was about 3.19 percent in 
1972. However, as labour input is measured in efficiency units, this group only 
provided about 1.97 percent of total efficiency input in 1972. That is because the 
productivity of this group is only about 55 percent of the average level. Nevertheless, 
the working hours share of the male-DEGREE-40 group was only 0.15 percent in 
1972, while the efficiency contribution of this group was about 0.32 percent as the 
productivity of this group is 1.91 times of the average level. Moreover, the efficiency 
share of this group increased from 0.32 percent in 1972 to 1.07 percent in 2002. This 
result shows the dramatic increase in working hours share of those educated senior 
males (from 0.15 percent in 1972 to 0.64 percent in 2002, see Table A1) on the one 
hand, and the decline of their relative earnings over the last thirty years (2.54 in 1972 
to 1.77 in 2002, see Table A2) on the other hand.  
 
3.2 Changes in relative supply    
We compare relative labour supply measured in efficiency units with the working 
hours’ shares at more aggregated levels in Table 1. The top panel is the working hours’ 
shares for different groups in seven years: 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1998 and 
2002. The middle panel is relative labour supply measured in efficient units at the 
same seven years. The bottom panel of Table 1 summarizes the corresponding 
changes in relative labour supplies over the 1972-2002 and six sub-periods: 
1972-1977, 1977-1982, 1982-1987, 1987-1992, 1992-1998 and 1998-2002.  
 
(Table 1 is around here) 
 
In the first two rows of each panel, the overall change in relative supply, i.e. 
Xt-Xt-1 in equation (5) is presented by gender. The top panel shows that labour input of 
females has been increasing from about 32 percent to about 43 percent of total 
working hours over the entire period. However, the middle panel shows that the 
relative supply measured in efficiency units of females is much lower than their 
working hours’ shares, only from about 25 percent to about 36 percent. The difference 
between the two measures is due to the fact that the average productivity of females 
(as measured by their efficiency units) is lower than that of males. Hence, their 
relative labour supply in efficiency units is lower than simple working hours’ 
proportions. The bottom panel shows the relative supply of females has increased by 
about 37.6 percent over the entire period, corresponding to a continuous drop of males 
(-16.2 percent). This result reflects not only the increasing role of women in terms of 
workforce participation but also their increasing productivity level. 
The similar analysis can be applied for other groups in Table 1. The top panel 
shows that working-hours proportions of college graduate (from about 2.3 percent to 
about 23 percent) and O-level holders (from about 9.7 percent to about 19.8 percent) 
has been increasing over the entire period. Meanwhile, the working-hours proportions 
of the NOQUAL group fell from 59.6 percent to 13.7 percent over the same period. 
The middle panel also illustrates that there has been substantial long-run growth in the 
relative supply of college graduates (from 4.1 percent in 1972 to 32.1 percent in 2002) 
and O-level holders (from 9.5 percent in 1972 to 17.1 percent in 2002), while the 
relative labour supply of the NOQUAL group fell from 54.1 percent to 9.8 percent 
over the same period. Thus, relative labour measured in efficiency units is higher than 
the simple working-hours proportions for high skilled workers, but lower for unskilled 
workers. Relative supply of high skilled workers (28 percent for college graduate) is 
also growing faster than low skilled workers (7.6 percent for OLEV). As regards the 
experience groups, the relative supply of male new entrants fell almost half from 5.1 
percent to 3 percent, while the relative supply of the senior males (with 26-30 years of 
experience) is quite stable over the entire period. Therefore, the relative labour supply 
in the UK has shifts a more educated and experienced (hence more skilled) structure.  
 
4. Empirical results 
To examine how relative supply changes line up with the relative wage changes, we 
implement the framework outlined above. We firstly test the changes of wage 
structure in the UK are from the interaction between relative labour supply net a 
stable demand. For this test, we compute the inner products of changes of relative 
wages with changes of relative labour supplies between time periods. In order to 
reduce the numbers of computations and minimize the impact of measurement error, 
we aggregate our 29 years into six five-year intervals centred in 1974, 1979, 1984, 
1989, 1994 and 2000. Then, the average relative wages and average relative supplies 
of our 96 demographic cells are computed for these sub-periods. The inner products 
of the changes in these measures of wages and supplies are calculated for each pair of 
these six intervals. 
The results of these calculations are given in the top part of Table 2. For the 
period taken as a whole, results in the top part appear to be inconsistent with the stable 
demand hypothesis in Katz and Murphy (1992). For males, only eight of all fifteen 
comparisons over the period are negative, as well as three for females. Thus, it seems 
that the stable labour demand hypothesis is only partially proved for the entire period. 
 
(Table 2 is around here) 
 
Moreover, inner products of wage and supply changes show a cyclical pattern 
for males, but an increasing trend for females over the entire period. As we expect, the 
positive associations between relative wages and labour supply are especially evident 
for males in the 1980s. For example, all comparisons between the interval centred in 
1974 and intervals after 1974 (that is, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 2000) for males are 
negative, while all comparisons between the interval centred in 1979 and intervals 
after 1979 (that is, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 2000) are positive. Then, all comparisons 
between the interval centred in 1989 and intervals after 1989 (that is, 1994 and 2000) 
are again negative. However, we cannot find negative inner products for females 
except a few comparisons associated with two early intervals centred in 1974 and 
1979, which may reflect a continuous acceleration in relative demand for female 
skilled workers after the 1970s.  
As the relative supply of skilled workers in the UK has been increasing 
continuously over the entire period (see Table 1), the changes of relative supply of 
skilled workers are always positive. Hence, the cyclical pattern of males must be from 
the cyclical changes of skill premiums. Panel A of Figure 3 illustrates possible 
supply-demand movement behind the above comparison for males. The horizontal 
axis represents the relative labour supply of skilled workers to unskilled workers 
(LS/LU), and the vertical axis represents the relative wages of skilled workers to 
unskilled workers (WS/WU). The relative demand (D1) and relative supply (S1) cross 
in the 1974 interval to achieve the original equilibrium. Since the relative supply of 
skilled workers has continuously increased from S1 to S6 over the entire period, the 
changes of relative wages decide the signs of inner products. New equilibriums in 
later intervals have to follow the trace of the dashed curve to keep consistent with 
Table 2. Hence, skilled workers have lower relative wages in the intervals centred in 
1979 and 1994, but higher relative wages in the intervals centred in 1974 and 1989.  
The only possible explanation is that the increase of relative supply of skills 
has surpassed relative demand during the 1970s (from D1 to D2) and early years of the 
1990s (from D4 to D5), between which the increase of relative supply of skills has 
been surpassed by the increase of relative demand. Hence, changes of relative wages 
of skills as well as inner products are negative in the 1970s and early years of the 
1990s. Thus, Katz and Murphy (1992) hypothesis is proved for males during the 
1970s and early years of the 1990s, while the 1980s and the 2000s seems more 
compatible to Machin (2001) hypothesis. 
Similarly, Panel B of Figure 3 illustrates supply-demand movement for 
females. Equilibrium points also follow the trace of the dashed curve to keep 
consistent with Table 2. Hence, skilled female workers have lower relative wages in 
the interval centred in 1984 and higher relative wages in the interval centred in 1974 
and 2000. After the interval centred in 1984, the relative demand of skills has 
surpassed the relative supply and pushed the relative wages to a historical height in 
the 2000s. Thus, Machin (2001) hypothesis is proved for females after the 1970s. 
 
(Figure 3 is around here) 
 
The top part of Table 2 rejects the stable demand hypothesis for the period 
taken as a whole. Consequently, the alternative steadily growing demand hypothesis is 
tested in the bottom part. We examine whether the observed relative wage changes 
can be made consistent with the observed pattern of relative labour supply changes, 
simply by allowing for steadily increasing relative demand. Thus, we include a time 
trend for relative wages and net labour supply in equation (5) to allow a steady 
relative demand growth. And then we take the average residuals over five-year 
intervals for each cell, and compute the inner products of detrended relative wages 
changes and net labour supply changes. 
The results of this procedure are shown in the bottom part of Table 2. If the 
inner products were negative, results would support the steadily growing demand 
hypothesis in Katz and Murphy (1992). Otherwise, the acceleration of relative 
demand hypothesis in Machin (2001) is proved. From the bottom part of Table 2, we 
find some evidences to support the steadily growing relative demand hypothesis. For 
males, eight of all fifteen comparisons still show negative associations over the period, 
as well as only three for females. Those positive inner products in the 1980s and the 
2000s (for example, 0.0017, between 1994 and 2000 for males, and 0.0023, between 
1974 and 1984 for females) are too big to be regarded as measurement errors. This 
result suggests an acceleration of relative demand for skilled workers in the 1980s and 
the 2000s.  
In order to test the robustness of our conclusion, Table 3 uses the same 
procedure for different time intervals (3-year centred interval) and different years: 
1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993 and 2001. We find a similar cyclical pattern of 
co-variation between the relative wages and relative supplies as already shown in 
Table 2, which rejects the stable relative demand as well. In the bottom part of Table 
3, more detrended results (eleven of all fifteen comparisons) are negative for males. 
Nevertheless, those positive co-variations between relative wages and relative 
supplies such as 1978-1993 (0.0023) for males and 1973-1988 (0.0052) for females, 
again confirm the acceleration of relative demand in the 1980s and the 2000s.
3
  
 
(Table 3 is around here) 
 
Figure 4 plots (log form) relative supplies’ changes against relative wages’ 
changes of the 96 labour cells between 5 year interval centred in 1974 and 2000 and 
five sub-periods: 1974-1979, 1979-1984, 1984-1989, 1989-1994 and 1994-2000. In 
order to find the associations between relative wage and labour supply on these 
periods, we predict wage changes from a weighted least squares regression for each 
period.
4
 These predicted values are represented as the lines drawn in the Figure 4. 
Since males are majority of labour input (see Table 1), the overall picture of all 96 
labour cells would follow the cyclical pattern of wage differentials for males. We can 
find the associations between relative wage and labour supply are negative for the 
entire period 1974-2000, also for 1974-1979 and 1989-1994, but positive for the 
periods of 1979-1984, 1984-1989 and 1994-2000. Thus, the six graphs shown in the 
figure reinforce the cyclical pattern that we find in the inner products of males. 
 
(Figure 4 is around here) 
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper examines the effect of shifts in the relative supply and demand of skills on 
the skill premiums and wage inequality in the British labour market 1972-2002. A 
supply and demand framework as in Katz and Murphy (1992) is built to examine the 
hypothesis that given stable or steadily growing relative demand, relative supply shifts 
can explain the changes of wage (that is, Katz and Murphy hypothesis, alternatively, 
Machin hypothesis).  
From co-variation of relative wages and relative labour supplies, we reject the 
hypothesis that the relative labour demand is stable over time for both males and 
females. By using detrended relative wages and supplies, we infer that an acceleration 
of relative demand for skills, that is, a positive association between relative wages and 
labour supplies (males in the 1980s and the 2000s, females after the 1970s). Hence, 
the steadily growing relative demand in Katz and Murphy (1992) can only broadly fit 
with the cyclical co-variation of wage and labour supply of males, but not for the long 
term growing trend of wage differentials for females. 
The acceleration of relative demand for skilled workers moves beyond the 
steadily growing relative demand model and can explain the continuous worsening 
wage inequality in the UK. However, these results cannot tell us why there is an 
acceleration of relative demand for skilled workers after the 1970s and what factors 
are accelerating relative demand for skills. Along with the technological changes, 
institutional factors such as decline of trade union should be important forces behind 
this model.    
                                                 
3
 Our basic conclusions still remain using weekly wages as earnings variable and head count 
employment as labour input.  
4  
Weights used here are the average working hours proportion over the entire period, i.e. E .  
References 
ACEMOGLU, D. 2003. Patterns of Skill Premia. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 
199-230. 
ACEMOGLU, D., AGHION, P. & VIOLANTE, G. L. 2001. Deunionization, 
Technical Change, and Inequality. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy. 
ACEMOGLU, D. & AUTOR, D. H. 2010. Skills, Tasks and Technologies: 
Implications for Employment and Earnings. in Ashenfelter, O. and D. Card 
(eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics Volume 4, Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
ADDISON, J. T., BAILEY, R. W. & SIEBERT, W. S. 2003. The Impact of 
Deunionisation on Earnings Dispersion Revisited. IZA Discussion Paper No. 
724. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. 
BELL, B. D. & HART, R. A. 2003a. How Important Is Guaranteed or 
Institutionalised Overtime. IZA Discussion Paper No. 766. Bonn: Institute for 
the Study of Labor. 
BELL, B. D. & HART, R. A. 2003b. Wages, Hours, and Overtime Premia: Evidence 
from the British Labor Market. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56, 
470-480. 
BELL, D. N. F., HART, R. A., H BLER, O. & SCHWERDT, W. 2000. Paid and 
Unpaid Overtime Working in Germany and the UK. IZA Discussion Paper No. 
133. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. 
CARD, D., LEMIEUX, T. & RIDDELL, W. C. 2004. Unions and Wage Inequality. 
Journal of Labor Research, 25 (Fall), 519–562. 
KATZ, L. F. & MURPHY, K. M. 1992. Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: 
Supply and Demand Factors. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 
35-78. 
LINDLEY, J. & MACHIN, S. 2011. Rising Wage Inequality and Postgraduate 
Education. IZA Discussion Papers 5981, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
MACHIN, S. 2001. The changing naturing of labour demand in the new economy and 
skilled-biased technology change. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
63, 753-776. 
MACHIN, S. & VAN REENEN, J. 1998. Technology and Changes in Skill Structure: 
Evidence from Seven OECD Countries. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Nov. 
NICKELL, S. & BELL, B. 1995. The Collapse in Demand for the Unskilled and 
Unemployment across the OECD. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, II, 
40-62. 
NICKELL, S. & BELL, B. D. 1996. Changes in the Distribution of Wage and 
Unemployment in OECD Countries. The American Economic Review, 86, 
302-308. 
O'MAHONY, M. & PENG, F. 2008. Skill Bias, Age and Organisational Change. 
Paper presented at the EUKLEMS final conference. 
O'MAHONY, M., ROBINSON, C. & VECCHI, M. 2008. The impact of ICT on the 
demand for skilled labour: A cross-country comparison. Labour Economics, 
15, 1435-1450. 
ONS 2006. Summary of main topics included in GHS questionnaires: 1971 to 2006. 
Office for National Statistics. 
PENG, F. & KANG, L. 2013a. Cyclical changes in the wage structure of the United 
Kingdom: a historical review of the GHS 1972-2002. MPRA discussion paper. 
PENG, F. & KANG, L. 2013b. Labour market institutions and skill premiums: an 
empirical analysis on the UK 1972-2002. Journal of Economic Issue, XLVII. 
WOOD, A. 1994. North-South trade, employment, and inequality: Changing fortunes 
in a skill-driven world. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
WOOD, A. 1995. How Trade Hurt Unskilled Workers. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 9 57-80. 
WOOD, A. 1998. Globalisation and the Rise in Labour Market Inequalities. The 
Economic Journal, 108, 1463–1482. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Negative association between relative supply and wages, Katz and 
Murphy (1992) hypothesis 
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Figure 2: Positive association between relative supply and wages, Machin (2001) 
hypothesis 
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 Figure 3: Relative wages and relative supply in the UK, 1972-2002 
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Figure 4:  Price and quantity changes for 96 demographic cells 
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Table 1: Relative supply changes in the UK, 1972-2002 
 Share of annual working hours (%) 
Group 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Gender:        
  Men 68.0 65.6 63.3 61.4 58.2 58.0 57.2 
  Women 32.0 34.4 36.7 38.6 41.8 42.0 42.8 
Education:         
  No qualification   59.6 48.5 40.2 30.6 23.8 14.6 13.7 
  O-level                  9.7 14.9 18.2 20.6 24.7 23.5 19.8 
  Degree                 2.3 5.2 7.1 10.3 11.6 18.4 23.4 
Experience (men):        
  1-5 years 7.5 8.0 7.6 8.0 4.9 4.4 4.6 
  26-30 years 7.4 6.3 6.2 6.1 7.9 6.6 6.6 
  
Relative labour supply (annual working hours measured in 
efficiency units, %) 
Group 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Gender:        
  Men 75.4 73.4 71.3 69.4 66.3 65.3 64.1 
  Women 24.6 26.6 28.7 30.6 33.7 34.7 35.9 
Education:         
  No qualification   54.1 42.3 34.4 24.7 18.5 10.5 9.8 
  O-level                  9.5 14.2 16.4 18.4 22.1 20.8 17.1 
  Degree                 4.1 8.9 11.9 16.4 17.9 25.6 32.1 
Experience (men):        
  1-5 years 5.1 5.5 5.1 5.3 3.2 2.8 3.0 
  26-30 years 9.2 8.0 7.8 8.1 10.2 8.6 8.5 
  
Change in log form relative labour supply (annual working 
hours measured in efficiency units,  multiplied by 100) 
Group 
1972 
-1977 
1977 
-1982 
1982 
-1987 
1987 
-1992 
1992 
-1998 
1998 
-2002 
1972 
-2002 
Gender:        
  Men -2.7 -2.9 -2.7 -4.5 -1.5 -1.8 -16.2 
  Women 7.7 7.6 6.5 9.6 2.9 3.3 37.6 
Education:         
  No qualification   -24.7 -20.6 -33.0 -28.8 -56.5 -7.0 -170.6 
  O-level                  39.6 14.8 11.4 17.9 -5.9 -19.5 58.4 
  Degree                 76.4 28.7 32.5 8.6 35.8 22.8 204.8 
Experience (men):        
  1-5 years 7.6 -6.5 3.6 -51.6 -12.8 5.6 -54.1 
  26-30 years -13.6 -3.2 3.8 23.3 -16.9 -0.8 -7.5 
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Note: Figures in this table represent the shares of annual working hours and relative labour supply 
measured in efficiency units (average relative wage of each demographic cell over the last thirty years) 
using the GHS 1972-2002. Samples include all workers in the count sample. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Inner products of changes in relative wages and changes in relative 
supply (annual working hours measured in efficiency units)  
A. Actual changes 
5-year centred interval 
5-year centred interval 
1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 
Inner Products of actually changes: Male 
1979 -0.0120     
1984 -0.0192 0.0029    
1989 -0.0176 0.0101 0.0016   
1994 -0.0384 0.0057 -0.0022 -0.0031  
2000 -0.0270 0.0198 0.0083 -0.0007 0.0068 
Inner Products of actually changes: Female 
1979 -0.0006     
1984 -0.0016 -0.0003    
1989 0.0053 0.0051 0.0020   
1994 0.0079 0.0098 0.0074 0.0008  
2000 0.0070 0.0110 0.0140 0.0039 0.0005 
B. Detrended changes 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data:: Male 
1979 -0.0016     
1984 -0.0028 0.0007    
1989 -0.0015 0.0001 -0.0012   
1994 -0.0011 0.0025 0.0000 0.0008  
2000 0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0008 0.0017 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data: Female 
1979 0.0006     
1984 0.0023 0.0005    
1989 0.0023 0.0008 -0.0010   
1994 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0001  
2000 0.0004 0.0006 0.0036 0.0033 0.0013 
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Table 3: Inner products of changes in relative wages and changes in relative 
supply (annual working hours measured in efficiency units)  
A. Actual changes 
3-year centred interval 
3-year centred interval 
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 
Inner Products of actually changes: Male 
1978 -0.0146     
1983 -0.0207 0.0037    
1988 -0.0299 0.0082 -0.0006   
1993 -0.0520 0.0038 -0.0068 -0.0034  
2001 -0.0470 0.0168 0.0000 -0.0035 0.0065 
Inner Products of actually changes: Female 
1978 -0.0010     
1983 0.0011 0.0010    
1988 0.0036 0.0036 0.0001   
1993 0.0103 0.0107 0.0064 0.0026  
2001 0.0009 0.0080 0.0057 0.0072 -0.0029 
B. Detrended changes 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data:: Male 
1978 -0.0017     
1983 -0.0027 -0.0002    
1988 -0.0042 -0.0004 -0.0010   
1993 -0.0025 0.0023 -0.0001 0.0004  
2001 0.0016 -0.0026 -0.0011 -0.0033 0.0006 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data: Female 
1978 0.0005     
1983 0.0025 0.0002    
1988 0.0052 0.0016 -0.0001   
1993 0.0012 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0002  
2001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0026 0.0054 0.0004 
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APPENDIX 
Katz and Murphy (1992) supply –demand framework  
Table A1: Annual working hours shares by gender, education and experience 
(percentage) 
 
GENDER EDUCATION EXP 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Fixed 
Weight 
E  
Male NOQUAL 5 3.19 2.10 1.25 1.32 0.50 0.39 0.23 1.27 
Male NOQUAL 10 3.69 2.09 1.72 1.40 0.44 0.30 0.33 1.40 
Male NOQUAL 15 3.95 3.26 1.91 1.72 1.12 0.49 0.47 1.82 
Male NOQUAL 20 3.68 2.98 2.69 1.64 1.27 0.69 0.55 1.97 
Male NOQUAL 25 3.76 3.00 2.73 2.46 1.52 0.98 0.83 2.23 
Male NOQUAL 30 4.75 3.06 2.93 2.03 2.14 0.93 0.77 2.51 
Male NOQUAL 35 5.20 3.70 3.05 2.21 2.43 1.41 1.05 2.86 
Male NOQUAL 40 10.89 9.91 8.50 5.43 4.40 3.13 3.95 6.67 
Male BOLEV 5 1.24 1.07 1.39 1.35 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.90 
Male BOLEV 10 1.89 0.81 0.99 0.97 0.66 0.40 0.43 0.84 
Male BOLEV 15 1.95 1.05 0.72 0.78 0.67 1.00 0.71 0.93 
Male BOLEV 20 1.51 1.07 0.89 0.59 0.79 0.86 1.07 0.92 
Male BOLEV 25 1.19 1.17 1.02 0.91 0.65 0.59 0.89 0.91 
Male BOLEV 30 1.38 1.46 1.25 0.91 0.86 0.59 1.08 0.98 
Male BOLEV 35 1.38 1.25 1.27 1.26 0.78 0.76 0.81 1.05 
Male BOLEV 40 2.83 2.97 2.89 2.27 1.64 1.52 2.12 2.34 
Male OLEV 5 1.56 2.32 2.50 2.38 1.53 1.13 1.35 1.97 
Male OLEV 10 1.18 1.71 1.86 2.24 2.10 1.13 1.32 1.79 
Male OLEV 15 0.81 1.53 1.31 1.51 2.00 1.94 1.33 1.67 
Male OLEV 20 0.51 1.16 1.41 1.10 1.38 2.22 1.65 1.45 
Male OLEV 25 0.47 0.73 0.88 1.16 1.31 1.90 1.74 1.19 
Male OLEV 30 0.38 0.47 0.62 0.92 1.47 1.12 1.21 0.97 
Male OLEV 35 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.69 1.09 1.36 1.07 0.81 
Male OLEV 40 0.62 0.89 0.66 1.04 1.43 1.93 1.64 1.08 
Male ALEV 5 0.68 1.25 1.19 1.25 1.45 0.98 1.08 1.19 
Male ALEV 10 0.59 1.50 1.47 1.52 1.54 1.61 1.44 1.36 
Male ALEV 15 0.33 1.16 1.24 1.40 1.53 1.57 1.49 1.22 
Male ALEV 20 0.33 0.47 0.82 1.30 1.30 1.89 1.39 1.05 
Male ALEV 25 0.15 0.32 0.58 0.75 1.38 1.46 1.61 0.87 
Male ALEV 30 0.16 0.36 0.41 0.57 1.02 1.23 1.19 0.67 
Male ALEV 35 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.39 0.59 0.98 1.33 0.53 
Male ALEV 40 0.08 0.28 0.48 0.50 0.67 0.99 1.39 0.54 
Male HIGHER 5 0.51 0.73 0.79 1.08 0.62 0.70 0.42 0.66 
 21 
Male HIGHER 10 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.25 1.03 0.89 0.37 0.98 
Male HIGHER 15 0.74 1.03 1.37 1.08 1.62 1.56 1.01 1.10 
Male HIGHER 20 0.62 0.67 0.93 1.33 1.30 1.58 1.16 1.08 
Male HIGHER 25 0.62 0.59 0.87 1.13 1.36 1.34 0.94 0.94 
Male HIGHER 30 0.54 0.60 0.61 0.93 1.29 1.51 0.64 0.82 
Male HIGHER 35 0.50 0.51 0.39 0.64 0.73 1.09 0.79 0.65 
Male HIGHER 40 0.57 0.45 0.62 0.69 0.54 0.87 0.81 0.59 
Male DEGREE 5 0.30 0.51 0.51 0.65 0.41 0.73 1.12 0.59 
Male DEGREE 10 0.36 0.88 0.99 1.39 1.10 2.04 1.90 1.15 
Male DEGREE 15 0.32 0.73 1.07 1.27 0.98 1.75 2.23 1.13 
Male DEGREE 20 0.29 0.57 1.00 1.26 1.15 1.83 1.97 1.10 
Male DEGREE 25 0.18 0.47 0.74 0.99 1.39 1.64 2.08 1.02 
Male DEGREE 30 0.17 0.33 0.36 0.74 1.07 1.22 1.69 0.71 
Male DEGREE 35 0.15 0.39 0.46 0.57 0.81 0.82 1.50 0.59 
Male DEGREE 40 0.15 0.30 0.23 0.44 0.70 0.51 0.64 0.44 
Female  NOQUAL 5 2.42 1.44 0.82 0.74 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.90 
Female  NOQUAL 10 1.67 1.07 0.79 0.75 0.30 0.06 0.16 0.72 
Female  NOQUAL 15 1.33 1.38 1.05 0.75 0.38 0.27 0.18 0.81 
Female  NOQUAL 20 1.59 1.51 1.42 1.13 0.89 0.36 0.31 1.15 
Female  NOQUAL 25 2.16 2.13 1.91 1.51 1.12 0.86 0.50 1.65 
Female  NOQUAL 30 2.99 2.62 2.50 2.08 2.05 1.02 0.75 2.12 
Female  NOQUAL 35 3.05 2.96 2.38 2.23 2.02 1.36 0.91 2.30 
Female  NOQUAL 40 5.22 5.27 4.59 3.26 3.04 2.13 2.56 3.94 
Female  BOLEV 5 0.87 1.17 1.31 1.16 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.84 
Female  BOLEV 10 0.83 0.65 0.83 0.89 0.58 0.28 0.23 0.64 
Female  BOLEV 15 0.49 0.60 0.40 0.54 0.63 0.52 0.64 0.54 
Female  BOLEV 20 0.34 0.61 0.47 0.56 0.42 0.64 0.88 0.55 
Female  BOLEV 25 0.42 0.51 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.48 0.89 0.65 
Female  BOLEV 30 0.46 0.54 0.58 0.64 0.99 0.70 1.28 0.71 
Female  BOLEV 35 0.45 0.67 0.58 0.69 0.88 0.96 0.90 0.69 
Female  BOLEV 40 0.69 0.76 0.89 0.83 0.96 1.05 1.57 0.91 
Female  OLEV 5 1.58 2.41 2.93 2.74 2.16 1.10 1.06 2.06 
Female  OLEV 10 0.91 1.17 2.08 2.20 2.59 1.14 0.80 1.70 
Female  OLEV 15 0.32 0.50 0.89 1.01 1.84 1.67 0.87 1.08 
Female  OLEV 20 0.18 0.37 0.75 0.86 1.42 1.47 1.36 0.90 
Female  OLEV 25 0.19 0.32 0.53 0.93 1.23 1.47 1.18 0.81 
Female  OLEV 30 0.18 0.38 0.51 0.80 1.35 1.36 1.11 0.76 
Female  OLEV 35 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.54 1.01 1.30 0.89 0.62 
Female  OLEV 40 0.20 0.33 0.51 0.50 0.83 1.29 1.23 0.63 
Female  ALEV 5 0.35 0.31 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.17 0.80 
Female  ALEV 10 0.21 0.44 0.57 0.72 1.08 1.52 0.82 0.74 
Female  ALEV 15 0.05 0.11 0.26 0.40 0.53 1.18 0.92 0.48 
Female  ALEV 20 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.31 0.50 0.87 0.55 0.34 
Female  ALEV 25 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.37 0.71 0.72 0.28 
 22 
Female  ALEV 30 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.10 0.35 0.66 0.64 0.28 
Female  ALEV 35 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.29 0.40 0.46 0.18 
Female  ALEV 40 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.37 0.68 0.19 
Female  HIGHER 5 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.62 0.45 0.38 0.38 0.44 
Female  HIGHER 10 0.35 0.45 0.65 0.78 0.73 0.62 0.67 0.61 
Female  HIGHER 15 0.22 0.42 0.41 0.60 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.52 
Female  HIGHER 20 0.28 0.30 0.53 0.68 0.79 0.82 0.75 0.60 
Female  HIGHER 25 0.26 0.30 0.45 0.69 0.89 0.56 0.85 0.58 
Female  HIGHER 30 0.21 0.38 0.46 0.50 0.83 0.89 0.96 0.60 
Female  HIGHER 35 0.18 0.32 0.27 0.48 0.62 0.80 0.83 0.46 
Female  HIGHER 40 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.36 
Female  DEGREE 5 0.10 0.22 0.40 0.52 0.63 0.90 1.38 0.52 
Female  DEGREE 10 0.06 0.24 0.44 0.83 0.78 1.61 1.83 0.74 
Female  DEGREE 15 0.01 0.12 0.29 0.48 0.55 1.27 1.46 0.54 
Female  DEGREE 20 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.36 0.58 1.34 1.43 0.46 
Female  DEGREE 25 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.64 1.21 1.32 0.45 
Female  DEGREE 30 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.51 0.71 1.43 0.33 
Female  DEGREE 35 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.56 0.90 0.21 
Female  DEGREE 40 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.26 0.53 0.13 
 
Notes: All figures in this table are calculated from the GHS 1972-2002. 
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Table A2: Relative wages of gender-education-experience groups to wage index (ratio) 
 
Wage Index (At), in 1995 
pounds 
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 average 
5.22 5.64 5.97 6.35 6.11 6.08 7.07 6.24 
 
GENDER EDUCATION EXP 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Efficiency 
units 
Male NOQUAL 5 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.41 0.59 0.58 0.55 
Male NOQUAL 10 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.76 0.89 0.65 0.80 0.81 
Male NOQUAL 15 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.91 
Male NOQUAL 20 0.97 1.01 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.87 0.97 
Male NOQUAL 25 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.99 
Male NOQUAL 30 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.04 0.98 0.98 1.00 
Male NOQUAL 35 0.95 0.97 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.97 0.99 
Male NOQUAL 40 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.92 
Male BOLEV 5 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.50 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.55 
Male BOLEV 10 0.96 0.93 0.86 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.87 
Male BOLEV 15 1.04 1.03 1.00 1.04 1.06 0.91 0.90 0.99 
Male BOLEV 20 1.12 1.10 1.10 1.17 0.97 0.95 0.90 1.07 
Male BOLEV 25 1.07 1.12 1.13 1.10 1.11 0.99 0.93 1.10 
Male BOLEV 30 1.06 1.06 1.20 1.14 1.21 1.11 1.07 1.14 
Male BOLEV 35 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.16 1.00 1.11 1.10 1.14 
Male BOLEV 40 1.01 1.00 1.08 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.03 
Male OLEV 5 0.53 0.60 0.59 0.53 0.60 0.52 0.62 0.56 
Male OLEV 10 0.99 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.88 0.80 0.79 0.92 
Male OLEV 15 1.21 1.08 1.16 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.07 1.08 
Male OLEV 20 1.34 1.22 1.21 1.17 1.22 1.16 1.11 1.21 
Male OLEV 25 1.38 1.32 1.22 1.24 1.25 1.12 1.11 1.25 
Male OLEV 30 1.47 1.27 1.28 1.35 1.12 1.18 1.27 1.31 
Male OLEV 35 1.45 1.47 1.37 1.33 1.38 1.23 1.20 1.30 
Male OLEV 40 1.38 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.22 1.11 1.15 1.24 
Male ALEV 5 0.60 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.61 0.61 0.68 
Male ALEV 10 1.08 1.05 0.98 1.05 1.05 0.92 0.94 1.01 
Male ALEV 15 1.51 1.21 1.18 1.14 1.23 1.24 1.11 1.22 
Male ALEV 20 1.26 1.29 1.30 1.34 1.30 1.22 1.34 1.31 
Male ALEV 25 1.76 1.36 1.29 1.34 1.44 1.38 1.23 1.39 
Male ALEV 30 1.27 1.33 1.53 1.66 1.35 1.46 1.34 1.42 
Male ALEV 35 1.42 1.45 1.64 1.42 1.49 1.18 1.46 1.38 
Male ALEV 40 1.18 1.16 1.20 1.39 1.29 1.17 1.10 1.28 
Male HIGHER 5 0.88 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.82 0.91 0.90 
Male HIGHER 10 1.21 1.20 1.08 1.17 1.20 1.10 1.33 1.18 
Male HIGHER 15 1.40 1.32 1.30 1.39 1.35 1.28 1.26 1.34 
Male HIGHER 20 1.61 1.46 1.47 1.52 1.27 1.42 1.18 1.44 
Male HIGHER 25 1.85 1.54 1.57 1.49 1.51 1.50 1.50 1.53 
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Male HIGHER 30 1.72 1.50 1.54 1.42 1.47 1.39 1.61 1.57 
Male HIGHER 35 1.88 1.54 1.73 1.33 1.24 1.39 1.52 1.56 
Male HIGHER 40 1.66 1.38 1.62 1.33 1.47 1.36 1.65 1.45 
Male DEGREE 5 1.00 0.92 0.87 1.10 0.96 1.04 1.10 1.02 
Male DEGREE 10 1.51 1.36 1.34 1.36 1.48 1.45 1.33 1.40 
Male DEGREE 15 1.85 1.65 1.60 1.62 1.80 1.83 1.61 1.70 
Male DEGREE 20 2.25 1.96 1.89 1.86 1.83 2.18 1.78 1.90 
Male DEGREE 25 2.11 1.95 1.81 2.25 1.81 2.23 1.86 1.94 
Male DEGREE 30 2.48 2.00 1.95 1.90 1.89 1.94 1.86 2.03 
Male DEGREE 35 2.59 1.90 1.73 2.05 1.55 2.12 1.98 2.00 
Male DEGREE 40 2.54 2.21 2.16 1.92 1.65 2.08 1.77 1.91 
Female  NOQUAL 5 0.40 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.58 0.64 0.50 
Female  NOQUAL 10 0.53 0.65 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.64 0.61 
Female  NOQUAL 15 0.54 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.83 0.67 0.46 0.64 
Female  NOQUAL 20 0.51 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.81 0.74 0.65 
Female  NOQUAL 25 0.54 0.65 0.67 0.59 0.62 0.71 0.64 0.63 
Female  NOQUAL 30 0.52 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.67 
Female  NOQUAL 35 0.54 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.68 0.68 0.81 0.67 
Female  NOQUAL 40 0.52 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.72 0.65 0.78 0.65 
Female  BOLEV 5 0.41 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.49 
Female  BOLEV 10 0.65 0.70 0.67 0.62 0.76 0.70 0.78 0.69 
Female  BOLEV 15 0.69 0.77 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.94 0.88 0.79 
Female  BOLEV 20 0.65 0.67 0.80 0.61 1.00 0.79 0.99 0.77 
Female  BOLEV 25 0.67 0.68 0.75 0.72 0.84 0.60 0.94 0.78 
Female  BOLEV 30 0.69 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.93 0.99 0.79 
Female  BOLEV 35 0.64 0.84 0.75 0.81 0.76 0.88 0.86 0.79 
Female  BOLEV 40 0.68 0.80 0.75 0.74 0.86 0.80 0.81 0.79 
Female  OLEV 5 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.63 0.53 
Female  OLEV 10 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.69 0.76 
Female  OLEV 15 0.68 0.83 0.83 0.93 0.84 1.04 0.98 0.88 
Female  OLEV 20 0.63 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.87 1.05 1.01 0.87 
Female  OLEV 25 0.77 0.78 0.86 0.91 0.88 0.96 0.92 0.86 
Female  OLEV 30 0.83 0.76 0.89 0.88 0.75 0.95 0.83 0.84 
Female  OLEV 35 0.91 0.93 0.83 1.00 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.90 
Female  OLEV 40 0.68 0.98 0.91 0.88 0.66 0.89 0.96 0.86 
Female  ALEV 5 0.56 0.59 0.70 0.65 0.59 0.60 0.73 0.62 
Female  ALEV 10 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.79 0.89 0.86 0.81 0.85 
Female  ALEV 15 0.88 1.23 1.01 0.91 1.18 1.12 1.02 1.02 
Female  ALEV 20 0.71 1.34 0.83 1.02 1.17 1.14 1.08 1.04 
Female  ALEV 25 0.77 0.76 0.87 0.95 0.83 1.12 0.96 0.94 
Female  ALEV 30 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.46 1.05 1.21 1.12 0.97 
Female  ALEV 35 1.26 0.75 0.95 0.93 1.02 1.06 1.02 1.16 
Female  ALEV 40 0.79 1.18 0.97 1.09 1.02 0.93 0.85 0.94 
Female  HIGHER 5 0.68 0.71 0.79 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.72 0.76 
 25 
Female  HIGHER 10 0.80 0.97 1.01 0.97 1.21 1.07 0.89 0.99 
Female  HIGHER 15 0.71 1.00 1.13 1.08 1.14 1.13 1.12 1.10 
Female  HIGHER 20 1.17 0.89 1.13 1.12 1.24 1.15 1.23 1.08 
Female  HIGHER 25 0.98 1.24 1.10 1.17 1.33 1.14 1.13 1.12 
Female  HIGHER 30 1.11 1.16 1.25 1.32 1.22 1.32 1.32 1.16 
Female  HIGHER 35 1.15 1.09 1.23 0.95 0.92 1.23 1.14 1.08 
Female  HIGHER 40 1.03 0.94 1.20 1.34 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.10 
Female  DEGREE 5 0.84 0.80 0.88 1.00 0.92 0.68 0.84 0.90 
Female  DEGREE 10 1.24 1.26 1.31 1.17 1.31 1.33 1.37 1.23 
Female  DEGREE 15 1.27 0.97 1.23 1.58 1.17 1.61 1.48 1.37 
Female  DEGREE 20 1.80 1.81 1.19 1.19 1.35 1.76 1.61 1.46 
Female  DEGREE 25 0.85 1.85 1.83 1.53 1.50 1.57 1.54 1.41 
Female  DEGREE 30 1.92 1.41 1.11 1.45 1.59 1.54 1.29 1.48 
Female  DEGREE 35 1.34 1.21 0.85 1.46 1.36 1.39 1.41 1.35 
Female  DEGREE 40 2.02 1.61 1.56 1.29 2.08 1.37 1.73 1.60 
 
Notes: All figures in this table are calculated from the GHS 1972-2002. 
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Table A3: Relative labour supplies of gender-education-experience groups 
(measured in efficiency units) 
 
GENDER EDUCATION EXP 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 Average 
Male NOQUAL 5 1.97 1.25 0.72 0.73 0.26 0.19 0.11 0.75 
Male NOQUAL 10 3.35 1.83 1.46 1.14 0.34 0.22 0.23 1.22 
Male NOQUAL 15 4.00 3.18 1.81 1.56 0.97 0.39 0.37 1.76 
Male NOQUAL 20 3.98 3.11 2.72 1.59 1.17 0.59 0.47 1.95 
Male NOQUAL 25 4.14 3.18 2.82 2.44 1.43 0.86 0.72 2.23 
Male NOQUAL 30 5.28 3.28 3.05 2.03 2.03 0.83 0.68 2.45 
Male NOQUAL 35 5.74 3.93 3.16 2.19 2.29 1.24 0.91 2.78 
Male NOQUAL 40 11.21 9.84 8.21 5.03 3.87 2.57 3.20 6.27 
Male BOLEV 5 0.75 0.63 0.79 0.74 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.51 
Male BOLEV 10 1.85 0.76 0.90 0.86 0.55 0.31 0.33 0.79 
Male BOLEV 15 2.16 1.12 0.75 0.77 0.63 0.88 0.62 0.99 
Male BOLEV 20 1.80 1.23 1.00 0.64 0.81 0.82 1.00 1.04 
Male BOLEV 25 1.45 1.38 1.17 1.00 0.68 0.57 0.85 1.02 
Male BOLEV 30 1.75 1.79 1.49 1.04 0.93 0.60 1.08 1.24 
Male BOLEV 35 1.75 1.54 1.52 1.44 0.84 0.77 0.80 1.24 
Male BOLEV 40 3.26 3.30 3.13 2.35 1.61 1.40 1.92 2.43 
Male OLEV 5 0.98 1.41 1.48 1.34 0.82 0.57 0.67 1.04 
Male OLEV 10 1.21 1.70 1.79 2.07 1.84 0.92 1.06 1.51 
Male OLEV 15 0.97 1.78 1.48 1.64 2.06 1.87 1.26 1.58 
Male OLEV 20 0.68 1.51 1.78 1.33 1.59 2.39 1.75 1.58 
Male OLEV 25 0.66 0.99 1.15 1.46 1.57 2.12 1.91 1.41 
Male OLEV 30 0.56 0.67 0.85 1.21 1.84 1.31 1.39 1.12 
Male OLEV 35 0.68 0.71 0.66 0.91 1.35 1.58 1.23 1.02 
Male OLEV 40 0.85 1.18 0.86 1.30 1.69 2.12 1.78 1.40 
Male ALEV 5 0.52 0.92 0.85 0.86 0.94 0.60 0.64 0.76 
Male ALEV 10 0.67 1.62 1.55 1.54 1.48 1.45 1.27 1.37 
Male ALEV 15 0.45 1.52 1.58 1.71 1.77 1.70 1.59 1.47 
Male ALEV 20 0.48 0.66 1.13 1.71 1.63 2.21 1.60 1.35 
Male ALEV 25 0.24 0.48 0.84 1.05 1.82 1.81 1.97 1.17 
Male ALEV 30 0.25 0.55 0.61 0.82 1.38 1.56 1.49 0.95 
Male ALEV 35 0.20 0.35 0.40 0.53 0.77 1.20 1.61 0.72 
Male ALEV 40 0.12 0.38 0.64 0.64 0.82 1.12 1.56 0.75 
Male HIGHER 5 0.52 0.70 0.74 0.98 0.53 0.56 0.34 0.63 
Male HIGHER 10 1.37 1.29 1.27 1.48 1.16 0.94 0.38 1.13 
Male HIGHER 15 1.11 1.49 1.92 1.46 2.07 1.86 1.19 1.59 
Male HIGHER 20 1.00 1.03 1.39 1.92 1.78 2.02 1.46 1.52 
Male HIGHER 25 1.06 0.98 1.39 1.73 1.99 1.83 1.26 1.46 
Male HIGHER 30 0.96 1.02 1.01 1.46 1.94 2.11 0.89 1.34 
Male HIGHER 35 0.88 0.86 0.64 1.01 1.08 1.52 1.09 1.01 
Male HIGHER 40 0.92 0.70 0.95 1.00 0.75 1.13 1.04 0.93 
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Male DEGREE 5 0.34 0.56 0.54 0.67 0.39 0.66 1.00 0.60 
Male DEGREE 10 0.56 1.33 1.45 1.95 1.47 2.55 2.34 1.66 
Male DEGREE 15 0.62 1.34 1.91 2.18 1.59 2.65 3.33 1.95 
Male DEGREE 20 0.61 1.16 1.99 2.41 2.08 3.10 3.28 2.09 
Male DEGREE 25 0.40 0.98 1.50 1.92 2.57 2.83 3.55 1.97 
Male DEGREE 30 0.39 0.72 0.76 1.51 2.07 2.21 3.01 1.52 
Male DEGREE 35 0.34 0.83 0.96 1.14 1.54 1.45 2.64 1.27 
Male DEGREE 40 0.32 0.62 0.46 0.85 1.27 0.87 1.07 0.78 
Female  NOQUAL 5 1.34 0.77 0.43 0.37 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.45 
Female  NOQUAL 10 1.14 0.70 0.50 0.46 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.44 
Female  NOQUAL 15 0.95 0.95 0.70 0.48 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.51 
Female  NOQUAL 20 1.15 1.05 0.97 0.73 0.55 0.21 0.18 0.69 
Female  NOQUAL 25 1.53 1.45 1.27 0.96 0.68 0.48 0.28 0.95 
Female  NOQUAL 30 2.23 1.89 1.75 1.39 1.30 0.61 0.44 1.37 
Female  NOQUAL 35 2.27 2.13 1.66 1.49 1.28 0.81 0.53 1.45 
Female  NOQUAL 40 3.82 3.71 3.15 2.14 1.90 1.24 1.47 2.49 
Female  BOLEV 5 0.47 0.62 0.68 0.57 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.40 
Female  BOLEV 10 0.65 0.49 0.60 0.62 0.38 0.17 0.14 0.44 
Female  BOLEV 15 0.43 0.51 0.33 0.43 0.48 0.36 0.44 0.43 
Female  BOLEV 20 0.29 0.50 0.38 0.43 0.30 0.44 0.59 0.42 
Female  BOLEV 25 0.36 0.43 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.33 0.61 0.49 
Female  BOLEV 30 0.41 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.75 0.49 0.89 0.57 
Female  BOLEV 35 0.40 0.57 0.48 0.55 0.66 0.67 0.63 0.57 
Female  BOLEV 40 0.60 0.65 0.73 0.65 0.72 0.74 1.08 0.74 
Female  OLEV 5 0.93 1.37 1.62 1.46 1.09 0.52 0.49 1.07 
Female  OLEV 10 0.76 0.96 1.64 1.67 1.86 0.77 0.53 1.17 
Female  OLEV 15 0.31 0.47 0.82 0.89 1.54 1.31 0.67 0.86 
Female  OLEV 20 0.18 0.34 0.68 0.75 1.18 1.14 1.04 0.76 
Female  OLEV 25 0.18 0.30 0.48 0.80 1.00 1.12 0.89 0.68 
Female  OLEV 30 0.16 0.34 0.45 0.67 1.08 1.02 0.81 0.65 
Female  OLEV 35 0.20 0.16 0.25 0.49 0.86 1.04 0.70 0.53 
Female  OLEV 40 0.20 0.31 0.46 0.44 0.68 0.99 0.93 0.57 
Female  ALEV 5 0.24 0.21 0.39 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.64 0.47 
Female  ALEV 10 0.20 0.40 0.51 0.61 0.87 1.15 0.61 0.62 
Female  ALEV 15 0.06 0.12 0.28 0.41 0.52 1.08 0.83 0.47 
Female  ALEV 20 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.32 0.50 0.81 0.50 0.33 
Female  ALEV 25 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.33 0.60 0.59 0.26 
Female  ALEV 30 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.10 0.33 0.57 0.54 0.24 
Female  ALEV 35 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.32 0.42 0.47 0.21 
Female  ALEV 40 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.31 0.56 0.16 
Female  HIGHER 5 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.47 0.33 0.26 0.26 0.33 
Female  HIGHER 10 0.38 0.48 0.68 0.78 0.69 0.54 0.58 0.59 
Female  HIGHER 15 0.28 0.50 0.48 0.67 0.78 0.72 0.73 0.59 
Female  HIGHER 20 0.34 0.35 0.60 0.73 0.81 0.79 0.71 0.62 
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Female  HIGHER 25 0.33 0.36 0.53 0.78 0.95 0.56 0.83 0.62 
Female  HIGHER 30 0.27 0.48 0.56 0.58 0.93 0.92 0.98 0.68 
Female  HIGHER 35 0.22 0.37 0.31 0.52 0.64 0.77 0.79 0.52 
Female  HIGHER 40 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.62 0.48 0.62 0.43 
Female  DEGREE 5 0.10 0.22 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.72 1.09 0.50 
Female  DEGREE 10 0.08 0.31 0.56 1.02 0.91 1.76 1.96 0.94 
Female  DEGREE 15 0.02 0.17 0.42 0.66 0.71 1.55 1.75 0.75 
Female  DEGREE 20 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.53 0.81 1.74 1.82 0.75 
Female  DEGREE 25 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.37 0.86 1.52 1.63 0.69 
Female  DEGREE 30 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.72 0.93 1.85 0.60 
Female  DEGREE 35 0.04 0.09 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.68 1.07 0.38 
Female  DEGREE 40 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.07 0.36 0.74 0.25 
 
Notes: All figures in this table are calculated from the GHS 1972-2002. 
 
 
 
